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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/05/2006 Accident number: 369 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 14/02/1992 
Where it occurred: Oupale, Xangongo, 
Cunene Province 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Inadequate equipment 
(?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [None] 
ID original source: none Name of source: HE/HGK 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: TM57 AT blast Ground condition: agricultural 
(abandoned) 
bushes/scrub 
sparse trees 
Date record created: 21/02/2004 Date  last modified: 21/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
no independent investigation available (?) 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
use of pick (?) 
standing to excavate (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
 
1 
Accident report 
No formal investigation of the accident was carried out. This record is derived from interviews 
with the site-managers, supervisors and deminers who were present. 
Clearance was being carried out without knowledge of current best-practices in Humanitarian 
Demining. The demining group’s management in Europe wilfully kept the ex-pat field staff 
ignorant of other HD efforts around the world. As a result, the clearance was taking place 
without concern for safety distances or PPE, and without the site-manager having strict 
control. The team was a small group of people who worked as a “team”, sharing decision 
making and learning as they went. 
A European TV camera team was present at the clearance site the day before the accident 
and the Victim had been selected to feature in their filming. 
 
The demining site 
The demining group were clearing an area laid with TM62B, TM57 and TM46 Anti tank mines 
with fuzes armed by clockwork. The machine dug holes at 3m spacing and the mines were 
placed either by men or machine. There were two (sometimes three) rows of tank mines. In 
this area, the AT mines were not protected with any AP blast mines. 
Some mines in the area had been collected and removed by local people. This was in 
response to a “bounty” offered for mines across the border in Namibia. The bounty was paid 
by the South African armed forces based in Namibia at that time. They apparently believed 
that the mines would be collected inside Namibia and so they were reducing the local risk to 
their soldiers and vehicles. In fact they were encouraging civilians on both sides of the border 
to take risks, and several civilians are reported to have died collecting and transporting mines. 
There was almost no vegetation. Thorny bushes had been placed on top of the mines to 
prevent cattle stepping on them. Mines were buried at a depth of 2-3 cm to the top of the 
mine, so the fuze was frequently exposed. The pattern was obvious. 
The deminers located the mines by sight, removed the thorns, exposed the mines, removed 
the fuzes and carried the mines and fuzes to a collection point. Between 150 and 1200 mines 
were removed each day by a team of 30 deminers. 
 
Events leading up the accident 
On the day of the accident the Victim was attempting to uncover mines with his pickaxe in 
order to unscrew the fuze. This was against the rules, which stated that pickaxes were only to 
be used as crowbars to lift unfuzed mines from the ground. When the Angolan supervisor told 
him this was dangerous, he argued that he knew what he was doing. The attention of the 
camera crew on the previous day is believed to have led to him having an inflated ego: he 
though that he was too “special” to die. 
When the Victim ignored the Supervisor, the Supervisor sent him ahead 50 meters to work, 
telling him that he should not endanger others if he wanted to take risks. 
The Victim initiated a TM-57 anti-tank mine with his pickaxe. He was killed instantly (see 
photograph in Medical report). His body was thrown 15 meters from the seat of the explosion. 
Medical staff were on site immediately, but could do nothing to assist the victim. 
 
Recommendations 
Site managers immediately issued clear and unambiguous instructions that deminers working 
dangerously should be ordered to stop work immediately. 
  
2 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 473 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: DECEASED 
Compensation:  Time to hospital:  
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Body 
severe Chest 
severe Head 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Arm Above elbow 
Arm Above elbow 
Leg Above knee 
Leg Above knee 
FATAL 
COMMENT 
The victim died immediately. See photograph in Medical report. 
 
Medical report 
No formal medical report was made available. The following photograph shows the victim 
immediately after the accident.  
 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a “Field control inadequacy” because the site-
supervisor did not command the authority required to stop the victim working dangerously.  
The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate equipment” because the lifting of live mines 
with a pick-axe seems obviously dangerous. 
3 
It seems likely that the responsibilities of those in the command chain were uncertain.  
However, the NGO’s command and control methods were in their infancy, and Humanitarian 
Demining norms had not been established at this time so there were no approved SOPs to 
adopt. 
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